Information

 

Officers and Council

Officers

President: Tyler Hildebrand

President-elect: Giuliano Torrengo

Secretary: Jenn McDonald (2023-2026)

Treasurer: Peter Tan (2022-2025)

 

Elected Council Members

Kenneth Aizawa (Past-President, ex officio)

Katie Robertson (2022-2025)

Michael Townsen Hicks (2022-2025)

Baptiste Le Bihan (2023-2026)

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2024-2027)

Zee Perry (2024-2027)

 

Group Session Organizers

Ryan Miller (APA Eastern)

Thomas Polger (APA Central)

Peter Tan (APA Pacific)

 

History and Constitution

For many years, the Society operated through annual sessions of papers on the group programs at both the Central and Pacific meetings of the APA. These programs continue. In September 2015, the Society hosted its first annual conference at Rutgers University, Newark. In September 2016, the Society adopted a plan to alternate its conference between Europe and North America. The second conference was at the University of Geneva and added a satellite conference, "Ground in Philosophy of Science", prior to the main conference. The third conference was hosted by Fordham University. The fourth conference was hosted by the University of Milan. And the fifth annual conference was hosted by the University of Toronto, Victoria College.

 

What is the metaphysics of science?

 

With the rise of philosophical ‘naturalism’, a growing range of philosophical debates have turned attention to the natural sciences: no longer the exclusive province of the traditional ‘philosophy of science’, the sciences (and their findings, concepts, models, theories, and so forth) are now of interest in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind and language, and beyond.

This, in turn, has fueled the pursuit of the ‘metaphysics of science’: the abstract investigation of ontological issues arising within, or emanating from, the sciences, and drawing freely on resources developed across a wide range of philosophical literatures.

Though we give a broad understanding to ‘metaphysics of science’, our pursuit nonetheless contrasts with other forms ‘metaphysics’ has recently taken, in both subject matter and approach. In the mid-twentieth century, ‘metaphysics’ was used as a term of disapprobation by (among others) Logical Empiricists, Wittgensteinians, and ‘ordinary language’ philosophers, in application to the largely transcendental and aprioristic projects of neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians. The late-twentieth century revival of ‘metaphysics’ in analytic philosophy has likewise often been pursued by aprioristic means or addressed issues transcending the natural. While the metaphysics of science overlaps with and draws on other regions of analytic metaphysics, it takes its foundation in the sciences, and is therefore neither transcendental in subject matter nor aprioristic in approach.

The Issues

There is a broad and exciting range of issues that arise in the metaphysics of science, including the following illustrative, and by no means exhaustive, list (where many issues recur in various areas).

 

General Philosophy of Science

Debates over reduction, emergence, levels, multiple or univocal realization, identity theories, higher level causation, and the nature of so-called ‘special sciences’; questions over the nature of scientific properties, individuals and processes and their ‘essences’ or individuation; the nature of mechanistic and functional explanation; the character of laws generally and specifically, for example ceteris paribus laws, special science laws etc.; the character of compositional relations between entities posited in the sciences, for example the realization of properties, constitution of individuals, and implementation of processes; evidence for physicalism vs dualism, vitalism and other alternatives; the formulation of physicalism and the definition of the ‘physical’.

Philosophy of Biology

The levels of selection; biological causation; concepts of the gene and genetic reductionism; the nature of biological entities; natural kinds in biology; biological functions; modeling techniques across the biological sciences; species and systematics; the homology concept; evo-devo and its implications; pluralism and realism.

Philosophy of Psychology

The nature of sensation, color, perception, emotion, language, cognition, mental causation, multiple or univocal realization, identity theories and materialism/physicalism; the problem of intentionality; consciousness and its place in nature; functionalism and functional explanation; the extended mind; the embodied mind, psychological universalism; models of rationality; evolutionary psychology; the existence and nature of innate knowledge; the modularity hypotheses; the existence, nature, and structure of mental representations; free will; eliminativism, intentional realism, the ‘intentional stance’, and alternative views of the psychological.

Philosophy of Neuroscience

The nature and status of levels, mechanisms, (ceteris paribus) laws, realization and identity in the neurosciences; principles about, and localization of, function and individuation generally; the material correlates of consciousness; neuroscientific findings and free-will.

Philosophy of Social Science

The nature of ‘kinds’ generally, and whether there are ‘kinds’ in the social sciences and how they differ, if at all, from kinds in other areas; issues over specific ‘kinds’, for example is ‘race’ a kind and of what variety; methodological individualism; experimental economics and game theory; philosophy of culture.

Further Applications

Extending work on the above issues grounds or informs answers to central questions in ‘core’ areas of traditional philosophy. To take but two areas as examples, relevant questions include (where again many issues appear in both areas):

Philosophy of Mind: The mind-body problem (i.e. the mind-body relation); the ‘Problem of Mental Causation’; the various ‘problems of consciousness’, hard or soft; ‘individualism’ versus ‘anti-individualism’, ‘internalism’ versus ‘externalism’, and, more recently, debates over the ‘extended mind’; cognitive architecture; the nature of mental content and concepts; the character and status of nativism; reductive versus anti-reductionist views of the mental; eliminativism; the ‘intentional stance’ and its implications.

Metaphysics: Debates over the nature of persons and personal identity, including the relations of psychological systems and states, animals, bodies, brains etc.; the possibility and character of free-will; the nature of ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’, and ‘constitution’ or ‘composition’ generally, in naturalistic philosophy; the existence of ‘fundamental’ entities or ‘simples’; the character and status of ‘physicalism’ versus alternatives; the formulation of physicalism and the definition of the ‘physical’.